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Introduction
With the development of information technology, especially the
digital media, copyright law has faced great challenges. The history of
copyright law in relation to the development of information
technology and communication modes suggests that modern
copyright laws are a product of a particular information medium,
printing technology.' Many of the copyright cases in courts that deal
with new technologies reflect not only conflicting interests among
stakeholders such as the music industry, Internet service providers,
software programmers and users but also increasing tension between
the role of laws and the development of information technologies.
Without recognizing the changing nature of the digital environment
and its participants, existing laws, including copyright law, may fail to
achieve the objectives that they were designed to accomplish. At the
same time, however, laws cannot continue to evolve in ways that
change their fundamental principles without sacrificing the
consistency and continuity that are the most important reasons for
their existence. This paper attempts to incorporate the creativity and
transformativeness of users' activities in the rules of copyright law as
a proposed solution to this tension.
The ease of copying and distribution has triggered various efforts
to expand copyright law and to strengthen the enforcement of
copyrights. At the same time, critical scholars are disturbed by these
efforts and suggest different ways in which the laws governing
cyberspace may or should develop. For example, some, such as
Yochai Benkler and Julie Cohen, favor preserving the public domain,
arguing for the public's right to speak and express views freely by not
expanding copyright for digital works.2 Lawrence Lessig argues that
"the code," the Internet's architecture, which once had transcended
the strictures of ordinary law, now will end creativity and innovation
on the Internet.' Believing that law, not technology, has won the
battle between copyright and technological development and hasstifled the growth of creativity in the Internet, Lessig calls for a
1. See ETHAN KATSH, THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE LAW 172-181 (1989); EDWARD PLOMAN & L. CLARK HAMILTON, COPYRIGHT
(1980).
2. Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
the Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Julie Cohen, A Right
to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace, 28
CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996).
3. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 3-8 (1999).
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limiting of certain intellectual property rights.4 Similarly, Siva
Vaidhyanathan, who views copyright as policy rather than property,
argues that copyright is not only unnecessary, but also is potentially
destructive to creativity.5 He notes that the fair use doctrine in the
copyright statute is evidence that the copyright system has always
been somewhat leaky, and the doctrine should remain in the
copyright law to allow breathing room. Other scholars, such as Jessica
Litman and Pamela Samuelson, insist on preserving the fair use
principles and applying them to digital works for the public's
6interests.
The fair use rule, which many scholars acknowledge as an
important tool for maintaining the balance of copyright, especially in
digital works of authorship, was the major issue that marked the
highly publicized copyright cases of the last few decades. Application
of this fair use rule tends to generate the disagreements concerning
digital copyright issues. The legal questions raised by Napster, the
popular peer-to-peer file-sharing system, concerned whether the file-
sharing activities of the users could be considered a fair use. In A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., the court's finding against a fair use
rested on the position that downloading mp3 files does not transform
the copyrighted work, users' downloading is a commercial use, users
engage in wholesale copying of the entirety of the work, and users'
downloading harms the copyright holders' attempts to charge for the
same downloads.' The court reached the same conclusion about
Napster's identified uses of sampling and space-shifting. The
traditional fair use analysis that does not tend to recognize simple
reproductions of the copyrighted work and ordinary use of a
consumer user led to the Napster decision and rationales.
Cases such as Napster suggest the need to explore why the fair
use rule is at the center of the copyright controversies triggered by
digital technology, how fair use decisions are made, what are
appropriate criteria for fair use analysis, whether the analysis should
be different for digital from other works, and how the concept of
transformative use that becomes an increasingly popular standard in
fair use analysis should be applied. This paper first will discuss the
4. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD (2001).
5. SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND How IT THREATENS CREATIVITY (2001).
6. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual
Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need To Be
Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 519, 539-40 (1999).
7. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
significant role of the fair use doctrine in the copyright system and
how it has been applied in recent copyright cases. Then the paper will
explore how the notion of productive use and transformative use was
developed and adopted, focusing on Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal Studios, Inc. and Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,8 and
critically analyze how courts have interpreted Campbell in defining
and applying the concept of transformative use to mean the
"creation" of transformative work or "work" that has been
transformed from the initial work rather than to mean transformative
"use." Finally, this paper will offer a new perspective to interpret and
apply the transformative use principle that is more consistent with
copyright's purpose and encompasses digital works of authorship.
1. The Goal of Copyright and the Fair Use Doctrine
Modern copyright laws recognize the objective of copyright law
to be the well-being of society, which is achieved by the
encouragement of the creative intellectual activity of authors and
artists, who are able to reap the rewards of their endeavors. The
copyright clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that "Congress
shall have Power... To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 9 Thus,
remuneration to authors is not seen to be the ultimate goal of
copyright protection required in the Constitution but a tool to
establish an incentive for authors to create. The utilitarian purpose of
copyright, expressed in the statement "to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts," also is found in the original British
copyright statute, the Statute of Anne of 1797, which is regarded as
the first modern copyright statute. Its title states that it is "An Act for
the Encouragement of Learning, by vesting the Copies of printed
Books in the Authors... during the Times therein mentioned."'1
According to the utilitarian purpose for which copyright law was
developed, monopoly protection of intellectual property and
incentives to authors should be provided only to the extent to which
the production of future works of authorship or of other kinds of
products is not stifled. As a result, striking a balance between
providing exclusive rights to the creators to stimulate authorship and
& Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), rev'd 659
F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994), rev'd
972 F. 2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992).
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
10. Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1709, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
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limiting their monopoly right to prohibit stifling use and future
creation of other works of authorship is both important and difficult.
A few copyright doctrines are designed to address this issue, including
the provision that the monopoly right is not regarded as a natural or
absolute right and that it may be conferred only "for limited times."
Another such doctrine is the rule that copyright does not protect
ideas but only a particular expression of ideas."
One of the most important rules that limit copyright protection
to reflect the basic goal of copyright law is the fair use doctrine, which
balances individuals' claims to their works against the public's right to
make the most beneficial use of the works. The concept of fair use is
given statutory recognition in section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act,
which provides that "the fair use of a copyrighted work ... is not an
infringement of copyright."' 2 When a copyrighted work is used for
purposes such as criticism, comment, reporting, teaching, research, or
for otherwise fair purposes, that use would not infringe the author's
rights. 3 The statute states that in determining whether the use made
of a work in any particular case is a fair use, the following four factors
shall be considered:
1. the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
2. the nature of the copyrighted work;
3. the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
4. the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work 4
Users of copyrighted work often use fair use as an affirmative
defense of their activities, but Judge Pierre N. Leval, in his famous
article on fair use, warns that fair use should not be considered the
exception to copyright but that its function is integral to objectives
and necessary to the overall design of the copyright system. 5 Despite
the importance of the doctrine in the copyright system, a precise
definition of the concept of fair use has not emerged, and in fact,
courts have described the fair use doctrine as "the most troublesome
11. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) states that in no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, etc.
12. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
13. Id.
14. Id. Courts differ in interpreting and applying these four factors and often give
different weight to each factor.
15. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1110
(1990).
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in the whole law of copyright., 16 Added to the existing ambiguity is
the recent significant shift in fair use analyses, characterized by the
focus on whether the use in question is "transformative," a shift that
began after the United States Supreme Court's 1994 decision in
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.7 The concept of transformative
use, or the productive use in other cases, influenced lower courts'
decisions and evoked a great deal of scholarly debate.
Much of the debate in scholarly discussions and court cases
seems to stem from confusion concerning the point of focus in the
application of the concept of fair use that promotes creativity and
increases public benefit. Should the rationale for providing the fair
use doctrine concern the end users' use of a work as the essential
justification of the use or the potential author's use of the materials
and subsequent creation of a new intellectual result? Courts and
scholars disagree on whether the policy goal that is to be achieved by
the fair use doctrine concerns the broad dissemination of intellectual
works and widespread use by end users or the creation of new
intellectual works that is stimulated and made available by the use of
copyrighted materials without the owner's consent. Where the
doctrine is applied depends on the facts of each case, but serious
problems arise when a rule that was made to handle one type of facts
is often used for the other. The following analysis of the development
of the transformative rule is guided by a concern about the answers
that are supplied to this question.
II. Development of the Transformative Use Rule
A. Productive Use in Sony
The first reported decision to use the term "productive use" was
the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony
Corp. of America.'8 Most of the prior fair use analyses in courts,
especially regarding the first factor of the purpose of use, had focused
on whether the work in question was used for a commercial purpose
or for a nonprofit educational purpose.' 9 But the appellate court of
Sony, discounting the district court's "simple commercial/
noncommercial distinction," found that off-the-air home video-
recording of broadcast programs was not a productive use and that
16. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1939).
17. Campbell, 510 U.S. 569.
18. 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981).
19. WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW (1985).
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the absence of a productive use precluded a finding of fair use.20 The
productive use in the appellate court of Sony was not concerned
about the end user's benefits that can be acquired by his use of the
VCR for convenience or increased access but viewed productive use
as requiring the creation of a new work. The appellate court, citing
Leon Seltzer, suggested that fair use had to do with the second
author's use of the first author's work to create a new work rather
than with the mere reproducer who uses it for its intrinsic, ordinary
purpose.2' The court argued that the statute does not list
"convenience" or "entertainment" or "increased access" as purposes
within the general scope of fair use 2 and expressed concerns with the
"harm" to a plaintiff by instant reproduction of the work in the same
mode and with the same purpose as the original, particularly in the
context of new technology, which greatly increases access to work. 
2
But the Supreme Court put aside the court of appeal's
"productive use" doctrine, stating that the "productive" and "non-
productive" distinction may be helpful in some circumstances but that
such a distinction could not be "wholly determinative. 2 4 The Court
also marginalized this rule by placing the limited discussion of the
issue in a footnote. Declaring that home recording was a non-
commercial activity and therefore presumptively a fair use, the Court
again shifted its focus on the commercial/noncommercial dichotomy
and decided that without any direct commercial gain from such
activity of time-shifting programs, the use was a fair use. Only Justice
Blackmun's dissenting opinion supported the use of "productive use"
guidelines.
Regarding the conceptualization of the productive rule in Sony,
the Court of Appeals seems to have used the concept of productive
use to mean the potential author's use of the work to create other
materials rather than the end user's use of work for diverse purposes.
The Supreme Court's view is more ambiguous. The Court does not
explicitly view the productive use as limited to the use resulting in
secondary works of authorship. But its rationale for rejecting the
productive use factor as a determinative factor shows the Court's
focus on the economic consequences of copying. It compares copying
of a news broadcast with copying of a motion picture, and copying to
20. Universal City Studios, 659 F.2d at 970-71.
21. Id. at 970; LEON SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 24
(1978).
22. Universal City Studios, 659 F.2d at 970 (emphasis original).
23. Id. at 971.
24. Sony, 464 U.S. at 455 n.40.
58 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [27:1
prepare lecture notes with copying to broaden personal
understanding, all of which may or may not involve the creation of a
secondary work. But the Court does recognize that the use of no
productive purpose, such as mere convenience of time-shifting, still
may result in a comparable benefit by increased viewer access. 5 The
Supreme Court's rationale for not wholly relying on the productive
versus non-productive distinction seems to show its uneasiness with
adopting the Ninth Circuit's position to acknowledge openly the
creation of secondary work.
Justice Blackmun's dissent position in the Sony case is stronger.
His discussion of productive use not only focuses on the creation of a
new work but even assumes that any ordinary use is non-productive
use.26 Blackmun notes that no author could create a new work if he
first were required to repeat the research of every author who had
gone before him; and in the case of a scholar's work, the fair use
doctrine acts as a form of a subsidy to permit the second author to
make limited use of the first author's work for the public good. 2 He
also argues that the examples in the statute itself, such as "criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research,"
constitute productive use, resulting in some added benefit to the
public beyond that produced by the first author's work. He concludes
by stating that "I am aware of no case in which the reproduction of a
copyrighted work for the sole benefit of the user has been held to be
fair use" 8 and that "there is (then) no need whatsoever to provide the
ordinary user with a fair use subsidy at the author's expense."29 Thus,
according to the Sony dissent, an ordinary use cannot be a productive
use, and increasing access to television programming is an attempt to
stretch the doctrine of fair use.0 Justice Blackmun's view is that the
Sony Court attempted to stretch the doctrine of fair use that permits
unfettered use of this new technology to increase access to television
programming.
Interestingly, despite the Supreme Court's avoidance of reliance
on the productive use principle, the principle continued to be given
authority." After Sony, the predominant meaning of productive use
25. Sony, 464 U.S. at 455 n.40.
26. Id. at 476 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 478-79 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 480 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 480-81 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
31. Laura G. Lape, Transforming Fair Use: The Productive Factor in Fair Use
Doctrine, 58 ALB. L. REv. 677 (1995).
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has been use that produces a new work.32 The term "productive use"
has been employed primarily to connote a use that changed the
copied materials in producing a new work.33
B. Transformative Use in Campbell
The term "transformative use" first appeared in Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., which cited Leval's work. Leval, in his article
on the fair use standard, argues that the first factor, the purpose and
character of use, raises the question of justification of fair use, a
defense that turns primarily on whether and to what extent the
challenged use is transformative.34 He used the term "transformative
use" basically as a synonym for "productive use" in that "the use must
be productive and must employ the quoted matter in a different
manner or for a different purpose from the original."35 Leval
distinguishes between simple restatement or repackaging and the
secondary use that adds value to the original. He states that "if the
quoted matter is used as a raw material, transformed in the creation
of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and
understandings-this is the very type of activity that the fair use
doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society. '" 6 He lists
examples of transformative uses such as criticizing the quoted work,
exposing the character of the original author, proving a fact, or
summarizing an idea argued in the original in order to defend, rebut,
or parody it, or for purposes of symbolism and aesthetic
declarations. 37 Thus, Leval is concerned about the social benefit as the
copyright law's purpose, but whether he focuses on the enrichment of
society by promoting more production of works or means to
incorporate other diverse uses of works for personal purposes is not
entirely clear.
In Campbell, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted the
notion of transformative use, citing Justice Blackmun's dissent and
Judge Leval's articleY8 Campbell concerned whether the commercial
32. Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics, 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1530 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(stating that the defendant's use was a "mere repackaging" and did not "transform" the
copied materials); American Geographical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 11
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); Weissman v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1324 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that
the use for the intrinsic purpose works against the finding of a fair use).
33. Lape, supra note 31, at 712.




38. Campbell, 510 U.S. 569, 578-79.
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parody of Roy Orbison's rock ballad song Oh, Pretty Woman by a rap
group 2 Live Crew was a fair use. Acuff-Rose, the record company
with the copyright to the original song, had refused to allow 2 Live
Crew to include the parodied song in the album, although the rap
group had offered to pay royalties. When 2 Live Crew went ahead
and released the parody song, Acuff-Rose sued for copyright
infringement. The district court weighed the four factors of fair use
analysis and held that the song was a fair use because it was a parody
that took only what was necessary to create the parodic element and
because it was extremely unlikely that the parody song could
adversely affect the market for the original." The Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded in that the song's
blatantly commercial purpose prevents this parody from being a fair
use.4 Citing the decision in Sony that "every commercial use . .is
presumptively ... unfair,"'', the Court of Appeals argued that harm
for purposes of the fair use analysis has been established by the
presumption attaching to commercial uses. 42
The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the notion that the
commercial nature of the use was a definitive factor, let alone that it
raised a presumption of unfairness. The Court stated, regarding the
examples of fair use given in the statute such as criticism, comment,
or news reporting, that "the central purpose of this investigation is to
see whether the new work merely 'supersede[s] the objects' of the
original creation ("supplanting" the original), or instead adds
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering
the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other
words, whether or to what extent the new work is 'transformative.' 43
The Court noted that "the more transformative the new work, the
less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that
may weigh against a finding of fair use." 44 Whether the Campbell
Court treated the transformative use factor as part of the first factor,
the purpose and character of use, or as a separate additional factor to
be considered in relation to the four statutory factors is unclear. The
notion of transformative use is introduced in discussing the first factor
in the opinion, but at the same time, the Court's opinion focused not
39. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1154-57 (M.D. Tenn.
1991).
40. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1439 (6th Cir. 1992).
41. Sony, 464 U.S. at 451.
42. Campbell, 972 F.2d at 1438-39 (6th Cir. 1992).
43. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-79 (footnotes and citations omitted).
44. Id.
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on market effects or on commercial purposes but on the creative
relationship between the infringed work and the infringing work.45
The notion of transformativeness in Campbell thus may be
interpreted as an attempt to touch directly upon the fundamental goal
of copyright in addition to doctrinal analyses of the four separate
factors. But the ways in which the transformative use was interpreted
and applied in later cases took many shifts and turns, which are
discussed in the following section.
Il. Transformative Use Rule and the Transformation of
Fair Use Analysis
Following Campbell, legal scholar Yochai Benkler proposed that
the transformative use principle could be an important basis for fair
use analysis of digital works of authorship that are characterized by
plasticity and processibility.46 But other scholars have criticized the
fair use analysis of the lower courts, suggesting that the concept
became monolithic and was transformed to give advantage to
copyright owners.47 Drawbacks and misapplications of the concept of
the transformative use created a great deal of legal confusion and
disagreements, which are addressed in the following.
A. Ambiguous Relationship with the Market Effect Factor
Courts seem to consider productive use or transformative use in
relation to the market effect rather than as something separate from
it. This tendency is not only incorrect as a matter of legal doctrine but
has the serious effect of emphasizing the protection of the initial
author's rights and profits.4 The productive use factor, when it first
appeared in the court of appeals in Sony, was concerned with the
harm to a plaintiff by reproduction of the work and increased access
to the work in the context of new technologies. 49 The court's rationale
for denying fair use arguments is that when the use is not productive,
the use that increases the access to the work would harm the initial
author. The Supreme Court opinion in Sony was also concerned
45. YOCHAI BENKLER, RULES OF THE ROAD FOR THE INFORMATION
SUPERHIGHWAY: ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION AND THE LAW 677 (1996 & Supp.
1997).
46. Id. at 676.
47. See Lape, supra note 31; Matthew D. Bunker, Eroding Fair Use: The
"Transformative" Use Doctrine After Campbell, 7 COMM. L. & POL'Y 1 (2002).
48. See Bunker, supra note 47.
49. Sony, 659 F.2d at 971.
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about market harm. While refusing to rely on the dichotomy between
productive and nonproductive time-shifting that is difficult to identify
clearly, the Court only noted that the statutory language requires
consideration of economic consequences of copying, and materials
with broader secondary markets have a broader claim to protection
because of the greater potential for commercial harm.5"
But it is in Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion that the
relationship between the productive use and the market effect factors
was explicitly discussed. Blackmun opined that when the proposed
use is an unproductive use, a copyright owner must prove only a
potential for harm to the market for or the value of the copyrighted
work." Blackmun not only assumed that ordinary use cannot create
benefit to the public at large but "when the use is one that creates no
benefit to the public at large, copyright protection should not be
denied on the basis that a new technology that may result in harm has
not yet done so."'52 The Sony dissent clearly considers the productive
use factor as linked to the market factor.
After Sony, the application of the productive use in lower cases
made the market effect factor count twice.53 When productive use is
equated with nonsuperseding use, it automatically is seen to satisfy
the fourth factor of market effect. The resulting focus on protecting
the first author's economic interests has an effect of wiping out the
first factor of the purpose of use and discounting the fair use balance
among the four factors. 4 In Campbell, the Court considered the four
factors separately in the analysis and in relation to the
transformativeness of the new parodied song. The transformative use
appears not only in the analysis of the first factor but in the analysis of
the third and fourth factors as well.55 In factor three, verbatim copying
in large amounts tends to suggest a nontransformative use.56 In factor
four, transformative use tends to reduce the probability of market
harm by market substitution.57 The Court particularly focuses on the
relationship of transformative use and the inference of market harm,
arguing that the only harm to derivatives that is relevant is the harm
50. Sony, 464 U.S. at 455 n.40.
51. Id. at 482.
52 Id.
53. Texaco, 802 F. Supp. at 12, 18-19. See also Lape, supra note 31, at 717 for relevant
analysis.
54. Lape, supra note 31.
55. Bunker criticizes this and suggests that fair use analysis has been "transformed."
See Bunker, supra note 47, at 9.
56. Id.
57. Id.
2004] REDEFINING THE "TRANSFORMATIVE USE" OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 63
of market substitution, and there was no evidence that a potential rap
market was harmed in any way by 2 Live Crew's parodied rap
version.58 The Court viewed the Sony case as the one where mere
duplication of the entirety of the original clearly supersedes the
objects of the original and serves as a market replacement for it and
compares it with the Campbell case, where the second use of the song
is transformative, market substitution is at least less certain, and
market harm may not be so readily inferred. Because a
nontransformative borrowing presumably can act as a substitute for
the original, an absence of transformation can serve as a proxy for a
determination of market harm under the fourth factor. 9 After
Campbell, many court cases explicitly made the link between
transformativeness under factor one and market harm under factor
four, and the transformative use rule works often as a complementary
factor for the market effect factor.6°
The approach of linking transformativeness and market effect
clearly reduces the benefit of introducing the productive
use/transformative use factor to fair use analysis in addition to the
four factors. Use of a copyrighted work is already less likely to be
considered fair use if the use influences the copyright holder's market
of the work. The underlying assumption is that if the market is
affected, it will influence the incentive of authors to create works of
authorship. In other words, the market effect factor should be
considered significant to the extent that the effect discourages
authors' productivity and creativity by stifling authors' incentive to
create. Such application raises the question of whether Sony and
Campbell intended to apply the productive use or transformative use
principle even if the use has the potential to reduce the incentive to
create new works. Lape argues that the fair use doctrine applies
where the benefit to society of permitting the unauthorized use
outweighs the harm to society of reducing the incentive to create new
works.6' Otherwise, the incentive to create new works itself would
have been the goal rather than the tool of copyright law, and the
principle of productive use or transformative use would not have
been needed in addition to the fourth factor of market effects.
Because the application of transformative use to later lower court
58. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592-94.
59. Bunker, supra note 47.
60. Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d
Cir. 1998); Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir.
1997).
61. Lape, supra note 31, at 678.
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decisions after Campbell is redundant with the application of the
fourth factor, discussions in the courts tended to focus even more on
protecting the initial author's rights and profits. Such a focus may
seriously skew the copyright balance, which is the underlying
rationale for including the fair use doctrine in the copyright system.
B. Confusion Concerning the First Factor of the Purpose of Use
Although Campbell introduced the transformative use discussion
within the four-factor analysis, the concept of transformative use was
applied in addition to the four-factor analysis- the more
transformative the work is, the less important are the four factors.
Thus, the transformative use was not explicitly incorporated in the
first factor analysis in the Campbell case but was employed as an
additional consideration of the policy goal of copyright. Later courts,
however, have begun importing into their application of the first
factor-the purpose and character of the use-a concern with
productive use or transformative use by questioning whether the
defendant transformed the copied material in producing a new work.
Incorporating the transformative use concern in the first factor
analysis itself may not be problematic, but employing it as a part of
the two-prong analysis-the first is whether the use is commercial or
not and the second whether the use has transformed the initial work
or not- seems to twist the result of the fair use analysis. For example,
the district court in American Geographical Union v. Texaco, in
dealing with the first factor, found that photocopying of scientific
journals for use by researchers in a corporation was not fair use
because the use was not transformative, although the use was for
research. 62 In Weissman v. Freeman, the use of a nuclear medicine
educational syllabus was not considered fair use because it was not
transformative, even though the purpose was for teaching.Y Focusing
on the productive nature of the defendant's creation of the new work
in these cases led to disfavoring socially beneficial nonproductive
uses.6 Consequently, certain uses become disadvantaged in fair use
analysis that considers a productive/transformative use factor,
including such uses as photocopying for research and education, news
publishing, dissemination of information through the Internet, and
amateur music performances.6 This result threatens to skew the
balance the fair use doctrine attempts to achieve.
62 Texaco, 802 F. Supp. at 16.
63. Weissman, 868 F.2d 1313.
64. Lape, supra note 31, at 715.
65. Id.
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As used as an additional requirement for the defendants, the
principle of transformative use not only directly contradicts the
rationale and philosophy that included the fair use doctrine in the
copyright system but also is not consistent with the definition and
intention of the first factor, the purpose and character of the use. If it
was to be included in an analysis of the first factor, the question
clearly should have focused on the purpose of "use" of the defendants
and how transformative or productive that use is, which could include
various ways of using the initial work from the perspective of the
users. But the recent cases consider the "transformed" nature of the
resulting work of authorship or the creation of a new work, skewing
the focus of analysis to the nature of the secondary "work" or the
"creation" from "use."
The transformative use principle should be applied either in the
way in which it was applied in the Campbell case-as an additional
consideration that touches upon the policy concerns for a situation
where the defendant is not an end user but a subsequent, future
creator of a new work-or in a way that incorporates the
transformative nature of the use itself in the analysis of the first
factor. Transformation of the analysis of the first factor by
introducing the concept of transformative use in this way would
provide useful guidance for analyses of general fair use, as well as for
analyses of digital works.
C. Transformativeness in the Production of Work Rather Than the Use of
Work
In Campbell, by stating that "the goal of copyright . . . is
generally furthered by the creation of transformative works," the
Court expresses more concern about the creation of new works than
the end users' use. The Court's position is that the more
transformative the "new work," other factors become less
significant. 66 Thus, if the "work" rather than "use" is transformative,
other factors have less force. This confusion of the transformativeness
of the work with transformativeness of the use is the reason behind
later disagreements among the courts and scholars. It also is the
reason why the transformative use factor, which has great potential to
provide guidance to fair use cases regarding many, including digital,
works of authorship, has proved less useful so far. In the Napster
decision, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit regarded the
factor of transformativeness as the first prong of the analysis of the
66. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
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first factor. Considering the purpose and character of the use, the
court asked "whether and to what extent the new work is
'transformative"' and concluded that downloading MP3 files does not
transform the copyrighted work. 67 In Napster, the transformative use
rule was also interpreted to mean the transformativeness of the new
work rather than of the defendant's use. Even though the Napster
users did not have direct economic benefit of any commercial gain,
their "saving" the expense of purchasing authorized copies of the
music was considered to demonstrate the commercial nature of the
use.68
The district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in Infinity Broadcast Corp. v. Kirkwood vividly show the
contrast between an approach that focuses on the transformativeness
of the work and one that focuses on the transformativeness in use.69
The district court had found that Dial-Up's use of remote broadcasts
is transformative because it is used for a different purpose than the
original broadcasts. While the purpose of the original broadcasts was
entertainment, Dial-Up's use was informational for its clients. But the
Second Circuit rejected this purpose-of-use-based approach by
arguing that Dial-Up had not altered the broadcasts but merely
reproduced them over phone lines. Even though the court found
some potential public benefit to Dial-Up, it still held that the use was
not fair use because of the absence of the transformativeness. °
If the transformative use factor focuses not on the users but on
consideration of whether their hard work deserves fair use defense, it
becomes a quasi-moral scheme that implies that the user must earn
the fair use right through good behavior." Bunker suggests that a
critical error of Judge Leval and his followers in the courts is their
incorrect focus on the transformation of copyrighted works rather
than on their broad dissemination, which in Bunker's opinion, should
be the purpose of fair use.72 In the copyright system, the hard work of
an author does not automatically provide the author with copyright,
as found in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,
which rejected the "sweat of the brow" theory and held that facts are
not entitled to copyright just because of the hard work of gathering
67. A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1015.
68. Id.
69. Infinity Broadcast Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 1998).
70. Id. at 109.
71. Bunker, supra note 47, at 22.
72. Id. at 23.
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the facts.73 Bunker argues that in the same vein, hard work or the
absence of hard work by a putative user should be irrelevant in a fair
use determination, and the issue of the public good should control the
analysis.74
The rationale behind the commercial use factor analysis of
Napster-that the users should not have gained or saved any
economic value from the use for their use to be considered a fair
use-also implies a moral judgment against users' benefits. Bunker
suggests that a way to make the public benefit a key variable in fair
use analysis is to acknowledge the value of dissemination of works71
and ideas in addition to the activities of individual fair users.
Bunker's emphasis on the value of the dissemination of new works
and ideas is a pertinent one, but the benefit of the public at large
cannot be achieved without paying adequate attention to individual
users' activities. Therefore, the benefits may multiply if not only the
broad dissemination of new works but also diverse and creative ways
of using the new works are encouraged. This paper attempts to
speculate the ways in which potential, creative ways of individuals'
uses may be acknowledged by redefining the concept of
transformative "use."
IV. Suggestions for the Application of Transformative
Use to Digital Works
The transformative use rule-as well as the ways in which it was
interpreted and applied in lower courts-itself has been criticized.
Does such criticism mean that the transformative use rule should be
discarded? Bunker suggests that the overemphasis on transformative
use is incorrect as a matter of legal doctrine and harmful to the public
interest and calls for a de-emphasized and clarified version of the
76doctrine. In contrast, this paper suggests that the transformative use
rule has great potential to become a pertinent and useful guideline for
fair use analysis, depending on how it is interpreted and applied. The
focus in interpreting the transformative use may be either the private
right of the initial author (to make a derivative work and profit from
it) or the public benefit. To achieve public benefit, transformative use
73. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)
(finding that copying names, towns, and telephone numbers from the plaintiffs white
pages did not infringe because effort cannot substitute for originality and no originality
was taken).
74. Bunker, supra note 47, at 23.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 24.
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may be interpreted in one of two ways. It may mean the creation of a
new work made possible by the defendant's use of the initial work,
emphasizing indirect public benefit achieved by the promotion of
creativity and a better information environment, or mean the
defendant's use of the work itself and how creative that use can be,
emphasizing direct public benefit by individual users' welfare. Both
approaches to achieving public benefit, indirect or direct, should be
recognized if the objectives of the copyright system are to be
achieved. The current ways of interpreting and applying
transformative use, however, focus either on the private interests of
the initial author's rights or the indirect public benefit achieved by the
defendant's use of the initial work to transform it and create a new
work out of the use. Critical scholars have suggested a shift of focus of
transformative use from the market effect and the initial author's
right to the dissemination of and access to existing works of
authorship. In addition, this paper argues for interpreting and
applying the rule as one that governs the purpose of use, as the term
itself suggests, in a way that encompasses creative and unprecedented
activities of users with different kinds of new works. The following
ways of redefining the concept of transformative use are useful in the
process.
A. Using the Rule As a Separate Policy Consideration
When application of the transformative use factor is concerned
solely with whether the purportedly infringing work adversely affects
the market for sale of the initial work, transformative use functions as
a redundant factor with the fourth one of market effects. But when
the transformative use factor asks whether the new work significantly
adds to the universe of information available to society, it begins to
function as an additional consideration to enhance public benefit,
which is the goal of copyright. Some courts, by focusing on the nature
of the new work-the transformativeness of the newly created
work-actually apply transformative use as an additional fifth factor
in fair use analysis. The "nature of the infringing work" seems to have
been introduced in such a framework. This approach may be subject
to the criticism that it turns fair use analysis into a normative analysis
by delegating to courts the decision of what constitutes a transformed
work and what kind of work deserves fair use defense 7 Bunker
points out that courts engage in very little analysis and show very
little consistency in what constitutes transformative use due to
77. Bunker, supra note 47, at 9-16.
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confusion with the notion of derivative work, which, by statutory
definition, is "any other form in which a work may be recast,
transformed, or adapted."78 In that case, the creation of a derivative
work should be at least some evidence of transformativeness.79 But in
Ty, Inc. v. Publications International, the court acknowledges that the
photographs of toys are "[a]t the least... derivative works," but later
finds that, without much analysis, they are not transformative. 8°
Despite this possible confusion and inconsistency, focusing on the
nature of the new work is still better than equating the transformative
use factor with the fourth factor, considering the market effect factor
twice and discounting the first factor of the nature of the defendant's
use, all of which may have the consequence of overly emphasizing the
initial author's rights and interests.
This paper also suggests that a focus on the nature of the new
work has other advantages in the changing information environment,
if transformative use is applied separately as a policy consideration.
When transformative use is interpreted to mean adding something
new to the information environment, which is not limited to
information market but includes noncommercial space, this factor can
function to achieve what the market effect factor cannot deal with
effectively. The factor of the market effect assumes a stagnant
market, including that for derivative works. But digital technology
generates more and more possibilities of creating new, different
markets or spaces for different products and activities. More and
more products or activities that may or may not influence the current
or potential market of the initial work evoke new, unprecedented
desires, interests, and actions that, again, may or may not lead to new
markets for profits. That is why Benkler suggests that focusing on
creativity and the transformative nature of a work based on a
borrowing is of particular importance in the context of digital media.81
A work can be substantially transformative so that it is not a
derivative work and does not share the market of the initial work in
any way but creates something new. The transformative use factor
can be used to encompass the possibility of creating a new, different
market or space for different products and activities. In that sense,
the factor of transformative use can function as something different
from the market effect factor or derivative work analysis.
78. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994); Bunker, supra note 47, at 11.
79. Id. at 11.
80. 81 F. Supp. 2d 899,902 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
81. BENKLER, supra note 45, at 678.
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Digital media has many characteristics different from traditional
media, one of which is its plasticity and interactivity.? Digitization
means that all information, including text, audio and video content,
can be used in any order and can be rearranged at will. Digital
content can be transformed for use in another medium-for example,
from text to voice or vice versa.83 Works in digital form easily can be
added, deleted, edited, or otherwise modified and manipulated. On
the Internet, derivative work products with a large array of differing
degrees of added creativity are produced and transmitted. "Digital
information, unconstrained by packaging," becomes a continuing
process." New works that never existed before and new markets for
new consumers are continuously being created. In such
circumstances, a focus on the fourth factor of market effects or
market substitutes denies most of the derivative works that are
created by digital technology because the market structure is so finely
divided that even a derivative work that appeals to a very narrow
segment of the market nevertheless can be commercially viable and
thus constitutes commercial substitute for the initial work.8 The
current fair use analysis, especially the fourth factor of market effects,
assumes relatively stable markets for relatively unchanging products
and consumers. Therefore, although the copyright system generally
has protected the market for the initial work, even within the fair use
doctrine that is designed to provide limitations on the initial author's
rights, digital technology rocks this rather stable market situation.
When the market effect factor is strictly applied, the very production
of new kinds of works and newly created markets and consumers may
be seriously stifled. The shift of a focus to the creative or
transformative nature of new, derivative works may then be a
welcome tool for maintaining the balance of the copyright system and
maintaining copyright's purpose of public benefit while being open to
yet-to-be-known ways of using and creating works of authorship.
In retrospect, what actually happened after Campbell is opposite
to the expectation that Benkler optimistically envisioned. In the
courts after Campbell, transformative use was incorporated as part of
the analysis of the first factor and interpreted as an additional
82. BENKLER, supra note 45, at 678; NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL
(1994).
83. ROBERT H. ANDERSON, TORA K. BIKSON, SALLY ANN LAW, & BRIDGER M.
MITCHELL, UNIVERSAL ACCESS TO E-MAIL: FEASIBILITY AND SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS
96 (RAND).
84. John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED 2.03 (1994), at 9.
85. BENKLER, supra note 45, at 679.
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requirement that defendants must prove to prevail on a fair use
defense. This incorporation occurred because transformative use was
narrowly interpreted pursuant to the Campbell case's factual
situation, which involved a secondary author's creation of a new,
commercial work, even in cases where the end user's use of the initial
work was at issue. As a result, the transformative use factor focuses
on the industry rather than social utility of the use.86 Next, this paper
proposes a new way of applying the transformative use rule as a part
of the first factor- the nature of the purpose of use.
B. Acknowledging Creativity and Transformativeness in the Use and
Individuals Users
In the fair use analysis after Campbell, courts often incorporated
the transformative use rule in the first factor of the purpose of use as
an additional requirement to produce a new kind of work. The result
was the expansion of the protection of initial authors' rights and
limited room for fair use of copyrighted works. But it is important
that the difference between the "creation" of a transformed work or
"transformation of the work" and "transformative use" be noted.
"Courts have been reluctant to conclude that access outweighs
copyright's incentives scheme" when the use is ordinary consumer use
rather than potential secondary author's use.87 Their reluctance seems
to reflect the information environment in which the modern copyright
law evolved-that of the printing press. In circumstances in which a
greater number of works in the information environment would
increase the benefits to the public, copyright law's incentive system
naturally focuses on the creation of new works of authorship. That is
why the modern copyright laws are structured in a way that provides
incentives to authors so that more works can be created.
But the characteristics of digital technology and computer
networks change the value of information based on its
meaningfulness. 8 As the production and dissemination of information
rapidly expand, offering points of view and estimating authority can
provide useful guidance to users. Information on the Internet might
be infinite and unbounded, but it is limited by the amount of human
attention.89 People's presence, time, and attention become more
valuable. In the case of business information, value results from
86. Lape, supra note 31, at 723.
87. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the
New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 263,286-287 (2002).
88. Barlow, supra note 84.
89. Esther Dyson, Intellectual Property On the Net, Release 1.0. (1992), at 13.
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interpretation and analysis by people, which depends on the specific
efforts and skill of the individuals interpreting it.90 In addition,
attending a concert and listening to a song on a tape are quite
difference experiences. 91 The value of information is thus generated
by the activity and presence of a person rather than by the ownership
of the content.92 The fact that real-time performance and services
generate value presents an interesting shift in which information
economics are based on relationship rather than possession. Building
a relationship with a customer becomes more important than
controlling the copies of the content.93 The relationship of the sender
and the receiver of information, the depth of their interactivity, and
the value of what is sent depends on the extent to which each
individual receiver has receptors such as shared terminology,
attention, interest, language, and paradigms that are necessary to
render what is received meaningful. 9'
An important possibility is presented here: receiving information
can often be as creative as generating it. Having access to
information, the ability to choose, process, and edit the information is
more important. Peer-to-peer technology qualitatively enhanced
users' access to the existing materials and abundant information, and
also increased the possibility of users simultaneously becoming
producers for their own purpose at the same time. Therefore, the
question of where the creativity lies-a critical one in copyright law-
becomes more complicated, and the distinction between creators of
information and users of information becomes fuzzy. In such a
90. Dyson, supra note 89, at 15 (Esther Dyson points out that although principles are
easy to develop, matching them to specific instances is the intellectual exercise that adds
true value). Barlow, supra note 84, at 15 (Barlow similarly points out the "question and
answer" relationships between authorities and those who seek their expertise).
91. Dyson, supra note 89, at 11-12.
92. Barlow, supra note 84, at 15 (Barlow states that "the value of that relationship
will reside in the quality of performance, the uniqueness of your point of view, the validity
of your expertise, its relevance to your market, and... the ability of that market to access
your creative services swiftly, conveniently, and interactively"). Dyson, supra note 89, at
32 (Dyson agrees by saying that "few kinds of content-based value that can be created on
the net would include services, the selection of content, the presence of other people, and
assurance of authenticity...").
93. Dyson, supra note 89, at 3 (Dyson explains that a subscription would be a good
way to solve the problem generated by network externalities and a need to distribute
broadly). See also KATSH, supra note 1, at 225.
94. Dyson, supra note 89, at 32; Brian Kahin, The Internet Business and Policy
Landscape, ANN. REv. OF INST. FOR INFO. STUD. 47, 66-67 (1997) (Kahin also
acknowledges that the ultimate value of the Internet or products and services on the
Internet depends on users' software, their ability to use the software, and their skills at
navigating the Internet).
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situation, a work itself may not be transformed and reproduction of
the initial work may be made almost in its entirety, but the use of the
work can still be creative and transformative. When a user's use of a
work or works is so creative that is not likely to be possible through
any pre-existing means and thus the public benefit is clearly enhanced
by this kind of use, the use is "transformative."
The characteristics of digital materials cut both ways for the
applicability and usefulness of the transformative use doctrine. The
characteristics of the technology of plasticity and interactivity provide
opportunities for users of information to become creators of a new
work by taking, borrowing, cutting, pasting, editing, and adding.
Users are now active participants in the process of dissemination and
the production of knowledge and information.9 What the courts and
even critical scholars of the transformative use principle tend to miss
is that the creativity involved in the use of works of authorship is
critical in digital environment. The relationship between the author
and user is not only blurred, but the ways in which value is generated
and the public obtains benefit from the information are transformed.
A redefinition of "transformative" poses a great challenge to the
interpretation of the precedents. For example, Justice Blackmun's
dissent in Sony stating that the consumer's ordinary use cannot be
considered productive use is in direct opposition to the active and
interactive users of the internet. The reality of the changing
environment suggests that without acknowledging the creativity and
transformativeness that occur in the process of the use of information
itself, copyright law lags behind, vainly trying to protect what no
longer helps to promote the progress of science and useful arts. More
"creation" of works of authorship is no longer critical or essential in
the progress of science and useful arts, because there is already an
abundance of information out there. Now dissemination of, access to,
and diverse, creative use of existing works of authorship for users'
personal purposes through customization, personalization, and
further communication become more important for public well-being
and happiness. When the ways in which value is created from the
works of authorship are changing in the interactive digital
environment, acknowledgement of the creativity and
transformativeness of more active participants and their new ways of
interacting, living, and seeking happiness should be an important
consideration in interpreting and applying the transformative use
principle. Thus, transformative use should be interpreted to
95. BENKLER, supra note 45, at 678.
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encompass more access, more usability, more personalization, more
freedom to use existing works, more communication, and the building
of more relationships using works of authorship.
Conclusion: Revisiting "Use" in the Interactive Environment
In the preceding sections, this paper has examined how the
notions of productive use and transformative use were developed and
adopted, focusing on the Sony and Campbell cases. This paper has
analyzed how courts defined and applied the concept of
transformative use as meaning the "creation" of transformative work
or "work" that is transformed from the initial work rather than
transformative "use." The results of the analysis suggested that the
productive use principle in Sony and the transformative use principle
in Campbell are concerned less about the public benefit resulting
from more dissemination and end users' use of works of authorship
than about the use of copyrighted materials to create new works of
authorship. But transformative use was largely interpreted and used
as introducing an additional requirement of having a transformative
character for the users of the initial work in many lower court
decisions. Consequently, the transformative use principle has had the
effect of expanding the protection of copyright holders' rights and
reducing the room for fair use of copyrighted works. If the meaning
of transformative use to create new works is not limited to the
original copyrighted author's right to create derivative works but is
expanded to include a new, potential user/author's creation of new
works (derivative or not), the transformative use principle can be a
useful tool for striking a proper balance in the concerns of all parties
in copyright. In addition, this paper suggests application of the notion
of transformativeness and creativity to the users' "use" of works of
authorship as well as their subsequent "creation" of new works,
arguing that interpreting transformative use in such a way is more
consistent with copyright's purpose and also encompasses digital
works of authorship in an interactive information environment.
Digital media are changing the ways in which people consume,
use, and interact with intellectual works and with one another. The
processes of digitization and networking have collapsed some
important distinctions that had existed in the American copyright
system, such as that between idea and expression, and among gaining
access to a work, using a work, and copying a work.96 The most
important but less recognized distinction that also has been
96. VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 5, at 152.
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influenced is that between producers and consumers of information
and culture. Reduced barriers make entrance into information
production and distribution easy, but attracting an audience or a
market much more difficult."7 The recent development and
widespread use of peer-to-peer technology drastically changes the
information environment once again by increasing its interactivity
even further. The system that is more open, interactive, decentralized,
and ungovernable is posing yet another challenge to the copyright
system that was developed in the context of another particular kind of
information technology. The challenge, furthermore, does not stop
with copyright law or even the larger legal realm. Despite the court
decisions regarding Napster and even "public spectacles of (its)
torture,"' the world does not note or mourn the end of Napster of
sixty-five million users for long.99 As Napster died, it merely yielded
space for newer and better technologies of competitors more capable
of meeting the current needs of users, who now have found other,
better opportunities) °°
Lessig's statement that architecture is a kind of law that
determines what people can and cannot do is a pertinent description
of today's reality. '10 Although some critics such as Raymond Shih Ray
Ku declare that copyright is no longer needed for digital works
because the economics of digital technology undercut prior
assumptions about the efficacy of a private property regime for
information, scholars still attempt to incorporate these kinds of
circumstances into the existing copyright system. 2' Useful suggestions
have been derived from a focus on the fundamental purpose of
copyright-the public benefit and public domain. Fair use, and
especially the newly established principle of transformative use,
seems to play a critical role in the copyright discussion. Bunker's
analysis of post-Campbell cases shows that "the presence or absence
of transformativeness is closely correlated to the overall result of the
fair use analysis."'0 3 Benefits of dissemination and availability of, and
access to, works of authorship that are missing from the current
97. Id.
98. Albert Z. Kovacs, Quieting the Virtual Prison Riot. Why the Internet's Spirit of
"Sharing" Must Be Broken, 51 DUKE L. J. 753 (2001).
99. Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Napster: The Case For the Need For a Missing Direct
Infringer, 9 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 57, 85 (2002).
100. Id.
101. LESSIG, supra note 4, at 58-59.
102. Ku, supra note 87.
103. Bunker, supra note 47, at 18.
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application of transformative use are noted by some scholars,"° but
their focus remains on the larger class of uses that may serve the
public interest. Still, individual users' use and creativity in the use,
which seem to play the central role in the interactive digital
environment, have not received proper attention.
This paper suggests acknowledging transformativeness and
creativity in individual users' activities in interpreting the
transformative use rule. If this new way of interpreting and applying
the transformative use rule had been introduced, the court in Napster
might have dealt with significantly different questions. The critical
questions would have been whether the file-sharing service allows
something that previous technology such as CDs could not make
available; what kind of new user activities are possible in addition to
listening to music; whether the service allows a search function,
sampling and browsing before purchasing to buy, a community,
interactive communication, emotional interaction, transforming
exercises with music files, or any other such innovative activities; and
whether all of these were adding something new to the music
environment or not. What the answers are to the above questions and
the kind of a finding they lead the court to make remain to be seen.
There would be many other questions that could be used to
determine whether a particular kind of use is transformative or not
and whether there is something new in the ways in which the users
use and interact with the works. But what can be assured by this
approach is an opportunity to explore in reality, before stifled by legal
interventions, whether the new service available through peer-to-peer
technology makes activities available that were not possible before
but that deserves a room in the constantly changing information
environment for the public benefit. They might include whether new
distribution and sharing system makes music fans more informed
consumers, makes the users more expressive and rational by enjoying
more information, whether the users can provide better feedback,
whether the industry then can become more responsive to users,
whether they use the music for more emotional and intimate
communication, and whether the quality of life of the public can be
substantially enhanced.'Y
Copyright law has faced great challenges in a rapidly changing
environment, and it will continue to do so with even greater speed
and intensity. Despite some scholars' progressive and provocative
104. See Lape, supra note 31, at 712-13, Bunker, supra note 47; BENKLER, supra note
45.
105. VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 5, at 180.
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arguments, to change the entire copyright system at this moment, let
alone to discard it, is difficult. Interpreting the transformative use rule
in a fair use analysis to encompass the notion of creativity in the
users' activities, which seems to be proper in terms of linguistic
interpretation and as a matter of law, could be a modest first step.
Arguing that every creative use or transformative use of a
copyrighted work should be considered a fair use would not be
consistent with the current digital reality. There would be many
situations in which the user's use of the work is transformative but, at
the same time, commercial and profitable, thus affecting the initial
author's market. In such a situation, the other factors such as market
effect and the purpose of use would balance out the fair use analysis.
What this paper suggests is that the question of whether a use is so
creative that it enhances the social value in a way that is not likely to
be possible if it is not allowed as a fair use deserves to be at least one
of the considerations in a fair use inquiry. Now seems to be a proper
time to shift the focus from markets and producers of intellectual
works to users and their activities.
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